Baltimore.com: Maryland public defender asks for stay in high court's ruling / Claims his office can't comply with requirement to provide lawyers at commissioner hearings by Tricia Bishop:

The state would have to hire 284 new public defenders to comply with a recent Court of Appeals ruling requiring lawyers for indigent defendants at thousands of annual bail hearings, according to an affidavit filed Thursday by Maryland Public Defender Paul DeWolfe.

"I have determined that the Office is unable to comply with the court's mandate at this time in light of its current resource constraints," DeWolfe wrote in the eight-page, sworn document, filed in the state's highest court. It accompanied a motion asking that the new requirement, outlined in a Jan. 4 opinion, be stayed for at least six months, until Aug. 1.

The Maryland Court of Appeals refused an earlier request to suspend the order, however, noting that judges "cannot declare that [defendants] have a statutory right to counsel at bail hearings and, in the same breath, permit delay in the implementation of that important right."

ABA.com: Lawyer Who Failed Courthouse Breath Test When She Arrived for Client Hearing Now Faces Criminal Case:

A California lawyer has been criminally charged after allegedly appearing at court to represent clients at hearings in a drunken state.

Michelle Winspur is accusing of blowing twice the legal limit on Oct. 7, when she was given a breath-alcohol test as she entered Kings County Superior Court in Hanford, reports the Visalia Times-Delta.

She was tested because a court clerk said she sounded drunk when she called to say she was going to be late for trial. ...

She was criminally charged in Kings County both with appearing in court under the influence and with drunken driving because she was seen driving to court prior to the Oct. 7 breath test, Larry Crouch told the Times-Delta. He serves as chief trial deputy for the Kings County district attorney.

David M. Siegel, What (Can) (Should) (Must) Defense Counsel Withhold From the Prosecution in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Proceedings?, Champion 18 (Dec. 2011). Once again, Siegel provides a great article. It will be available online at www.nacdl.org in about four weeks.

BLT: D.C. Attorney, Charged In Scheme, Fights Prosecutors Over Evidence:

A criminal defense lawyer in Washington who is charged with trying to illegally dupe jurors in a criminal case to benefit a client is quarreling with prosecutors over when he can get his hands on key pieces of evidence.

The attorney, Charles Daum, who was indicted with two private defense investigators earlier this year, said he should see any inconsistent statements among the government’s cooperating witnesses no later than 60 days before the start of trial.

Prosecutors contend that Daum and the investigators, Iman Pasha and Daaiyah Pasha, participated in a scheme that included the presentation of staged photographs to jurors and the use of perjured testimony.

. . .

Daum’s lawyers said the prosecution is built on witnesses “with acknowledged histories of fabricating evidence” and who were “given substantial incentives to assist the government with this high-profile and unusual prosecution.”

Defense counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the Guidelines calculation. The actual range was 188-235 months, not the 262 he was sentenced to. The district court's sentence was clear error. United States v. Manning, 11-1775 (8th Cir. January 17, 2012) (unpublished):

On appeal Manning argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not examine the full PSR or review it with him and did not submit timely objections or a sentencing memorandum. The government agrees that Manning received ineffective assistance of counsel but for a different reason. It submits that Manning's sentence was based on an erroneous application of the career offender provision and that his counsel should have objected. Manning's offense level was incorrectly calculated in the PSR which had used a statutory maximum punishment of life imprisonment for Manning's drug offense rather than the correct statutory maximum of 40 years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii) (possession offense and penalty). With a three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility Manning's base offense level should have actually been 34 with a total offense level of 31. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). The correct guideline range should thus have been 188–235 months.

I love it how in the Eighth Circuit the court usually omits the name of the judge reversed.

Chicago Tribune reporting from AP: Indiana County has no public defenders for capital cases:

FORT WAYNE, Ind.— Indiana's second most populous county has no certified public defenders to handle capital cases as the state wrestles with prosecuting one of its most notorious slaying cases in recent years.

Such certification allows counties to be reimbursed by the state for defense costs incurred during capital cases, The Journal Gazette reported Sunday (http://bit.ly/zaMpq7 ). However, with prosecutors filing fewer death penalty cases, defense attorneys are finding other ways to meet continuing legal education requirements, said Paula Sites, assistant executive director of the Indiana Public Defender Council.

The Atlantic: For the Prosecution, Justice Clarence Thomas:

Why does the justice usually side with cheating prosecutors, even when the evidence against them is clear and damning?

. . .

. . . But if true history is in the details, I hope Justice Thomas' future biographers will also take a long look at his dubious work in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct. At a time when Americans are just now awakening to the ugly truth about their justice systems, when dozens of capital defendants each year are exonerated, it's remarkable that Justice Thomas continues to adhere to a grim philosophy that justifies constitutional violations and excuses cheating on the part of prosecutors.

Iowa reduced from 60 to 30 days suspension of a criminal defense lawyer for withdrawing more than he earned from his trust account and not apprising the client of the fee activity. In re Boles, 11–0435 (Iowa January 6, 2012):

Boles’ violations primarily result from his flagrant, multiyear disregard for the billing and accounting requirements of our profession. He withdrew unearned fees, delayed responding to client requests for accurate billings, and failed to promptly refund unearned fees. Contemporaneous billing requirements provide transparency to help ensure lawyers treat clients honestly and deal fairly with clients purchasing legal services. These record-keeping rules are essential to upholding public confidence in the justice system. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 59 (Iowa 1998) (noting these rules safeguard lawyers from acting unethically and protect the client’s interest). Boles’ neglect of Smith’s postconviction relief action is noted, as is his private admonishment in 2000 for neglecting a postconviction relief case. The focus of our concern is Boles’ trust account violations and failure to promptly refund unearned fees. Sloppy billing practices and a stressful trial and travel schedule might explain delays in preparing and sending clients accurate billing statements, but do not justify a lawyer paying himself fees before earning them or failing to properly bill for them. The most egregious example is Boles’ handling of the Eides matters. He paid himself $13,260.68 more than he had earned by July 20, 2006, according to his own records at that time, without providing any contemporaneous notice or billing. He failed to issue the refund in that amount until March of 2008, seventeen months after the matters were fully concluded and over five months after the client requested a refund and itemization. Even his subsequent revised accounting showed he had owed the Eides $3602.50.

Law.com: Los Angeles attorney pleads not guilty to smuggling drugs into jail by Amanda Bronstad:

A solo practitioner in Los Angeles has pleaded not guilty to charges that he smuggled 26 balloons containing heroin and methamphetamine into a holding facility where his client was being held pending a court appearance in an attempted carjacking case.

An indigent accused has right to counsel at first bail hearing. Dewolfe v. Richmond, 11-34 (Md. January 4, 2012):

When an individual is arrested, he or she must go before a judicial officer for an initial appearance, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-213(a). The judicial officer, who in all instances relevant to the matter sub judice is a District Court Commissioner “Commissioner”), has a number of duties at the initial appearance, among which is to comply with the pretrial release provisions of Maryland Rule 4-216. That rule requires the Commissioner to determine whether there was probable cause for the arrest and, if so, whether the defendant should be released on his or her own recognizance, on bail, or not at all.

We are asked in this appeal whether an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel when a Commissioner makes the Rule 4-216 bail determination. We hold, for the reasons that follow, that an indigent defendant is entitled to such representation, under Maryland’s Public Defender statute, Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), §§ 16-101 through 16-403 of the Criminal Procedure Article (hereafter “Public Defender Act” or “Act”).